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Making the case for ECRIS: Post “Brexit” sharing of criminal records information 
between the European Union and United Kingdom  
Abstract 
Criminal record information has various uses including, in the detection of crime, as 
evidence in criminal proceedings, in consideration of an appropriate sentence after 
conviction and in determining the suitability of an individual for, or providing a bar to, 
employment. As such this information can have a high value but can also significantly 
interfere with a person’s right to private and family life under Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  The importance of Article 8 in this area has been 
increasingly recognised in both domestically and in Strasbourg with such case law 
making clear the imperative that criminal record information is accurate, retained and 
disclosed only in proper circumstances and, where appropriate, is capable of being 
subject to proper challenge. The operation of the European Criminal Records 
Information System (ECRIS) for exchange of criminal records between member states 
is explored and the benefits and risks of exchanging criminal records information within 
such an automated system are identified. The compliance of ECRIS to Article 8 ECHR 
is considered and suggestions made for future improvements.  Evidence is provided that 
ECRIS constitutes a singular improvement on earlier ad-hoc arrangements and should 
therefore be retained by the United Kingdom post-Brexit.  
Keywords: Criminal records; ECRIS; criminal justice co-operation; Brexit; information 
sharing; Article 8 ECHR.  
Introduction 
The European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) was established in 2012 
to enable Member States to exchange criminal records information for criminal justice 
purposes. Currently Member States send approximately 288,000 requests per year on 
previous criminal convictions across the EU through ECRIS1. The European 
Commission is currently in the process of expanding the system to include the exchange 
of criminal records information of non-EU citizens.2 The position of the United 
Kingdom within the European Union is currently the subject of major uncertainty 
following the result of the referendum held on the 23rd June 2016 in which the United 
Kingdom voted by a majority of 52% to 48% to leave the European Union (“Brexit”). 
The timescale and mechanism for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the 
European Union and the nature of the future relationship is, at the time of writing, 
unknown. What is clear is that there is likely to be a protracted series of negotiations to 
establish new (or retain existing) UK – EU relationships in areas such as trade, 
migration and criminal justice co-operation.  
                                                          
1 European Commission Press Release 19th January 2016: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-87_en.htm 
<last accessed 18 November 2016> 
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This paper will present a case supporting the retention of ECRIS as part of post-Brexit 
UK – EU criminal justice co-operation and, by reviewing the operation of the system 
and its compliance with Article 8 ECHR seek to provide a justification for the retention 
of ECRIS as the fairest, most efficient and most robust mechanism of exchange 
available.  It is clear that the sharing of information in a Union predicated on the free 
movement of citizens is essential to the maintenance of law and order. It is contended 
that due to the current high numbers of EU citizens resident in the UK (and vice versa) 
as well as the likelihood that any post-Brexit access to the European free market will 
require at least some form of free movement agreement the sharing of criminal justice 
information between the UK and EU will remain imperative.  
As identified above, consideration will be given to the operation of ECRIS and the 
extent to which the current system for the automatic transmission of criminal records 
information allows Member States to understand and utilise the information received in 
a fair, reliable and lawful way. Equally any automated system has to ensure that the 
information which is exchanged is accurate, retained and disclosed only in proper 
circumstances and, where appropriate, subject to challenge. The considerable benefits 
offered by ECRIS will be emphasised and any continuing difficulties identified, 
drawing inter alia upon the authors’ findings from a pre-ECRIS research project.  
Although there have been significant case law developments in relation to the 
proportionality of the UK system of recording and sharing criminal records information3 
there has been little review or consideration of the ECRIS system to date. The potential 
Article 8 implications emanating from the exchange of criminal records information via 
ECRIS will be explored and suggestions for appropriate changes in policy and practice 
will be made.  
Criminal records information may be used for a number of purposes including; in 
evidence in criminal proceedings4, the determination of an appropriate sentence 
following conviction5 and in determining the suitability of an individual for, or in some 
instances providing a bar to, employment6. The European Union has set itself the 
objective of providing citizens with a high level of safety within the area of freedom, 
security and justice7. In a Union which facilitates the free movement of its citizens it is 
perhaps axiomatic that achieving this objective presupposes the exchange, between the 
                                                          
3 See, for example, R (on the application of P) v Secretary of State for Justice [2016] EWHC 89 (Admin); Gallagher’s 
Application for Judicial Review, Re [2015] NIQB 63; R. (on the application of T) v Chief Constable of Greater 
Manchester [2014] UKSC 35; MM v United Kingdom (24029/07) ECHR; 13 November 2012; R. (on the application of 
L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3. See also Grace, J., Old convictions never die, they just 
fade away: the permanency of convictions and cautions for criminal offences in the UK, J. Crim. L.  (2014) 78(2), 121-
135 
4 For example; in determining whether a defendant is entitled to a good character direction, see R v Benjamin 
[2015] EWCA Crim 1377; or as evidence of a defendant’s bad character subject to the application of Part 11, 
Chapter 1 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, see R v Cortes Plaza [2013] EWCA Crim 501; R v Brooks [2014] EWCA 
Crim 562; R v Mehmedov [2014] EWCA Crim 1523.  
5 In England and Wales, by virtue of s.143 (2) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a sentencing court when determining 
the seriousness of an offence must consider a defendant’s previous conviction(s) as an aggravating factor provided 
the conviction(s) can reasonably be so treated having regard, in particular, to the nature of the offence(s) and its 
relevance to the current offence(s) and the time that has elapsed since conviction.  
6 See R (L) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2009] UKSC 3.  
7 Article 67(3) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2012/C 326/01 
competent authorities of the Member States, of information extracted from criminal 
records8. This is emphasised, in the context of criminal proceedings by the requirement 
of Article 3(1) of Council Framework Decision 2008/675/JHA that: 
Each member state shall ensure that in the course of criminal proceedings 
against a person, previous convictions handed down against the same person for 
different facts in other member states, in respect of which information has been 
obtained under applicable instruments on mutual legal assistance or on the 
exchange of information extracted from criminal records, are taken into account 
to the extent previous national convictions are taken into account, and that 
equivalent legal effects are attached to them as to previous national convictions, 
in accordance with national law. 
 
The case of Michel Fourniret9 provides a cogent example of the need for such 
information exchange between Member States. In 1987 Fourniret was sentenced to 7 
years imprisonment in France for sexual offences involving minors. He was released 
after less than one year in custody for a combination of good behaviour and due to a 
period of time spent in custody prior to his conviction. Following his release Fourniret 
                                                          
8 V Mitsilegas. EU criminal law. Bloomsbury Publishing, 2009. Chapter 5;  J Monar. The EU's approach post-
September 11: global terrorism as a multidimensional law enforcement challenge. Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 20.2 (2007): 267-283. 
9 For a discussion of the Fourniret case see SJ Leistadt, P Linkowski & X Bongaerts. The Myth of Virginity: The Case of 
a Franco-Belgian Serial Killer, (2011) J Forensic Sci, 56(4), 1064-1071 
moved to Belgium where he was able to secure employment as a school supervisor as a 
result of the Belgian authorities being unaware of his convictions. In 2004 Fourniret 
admitted murdering nine young women and girls in the Ardennes border region between 
Belgium and France. In respect of the fact that Fourniret’s previous convictions for 
sexual offences had not been shared with other Member States, the French Public 
Prosecutor, Yves Charpenel, commented in an interview with AFP news; "At the time 
there were no laws to ensure the traceability of sexual offenders, so in my view there 
were no failures of the system, given the judicial context at the time."10 More recently 
terror attacks in Paris and Brussels have again highlighted the need for effective 
information sharing between Member States. Věra Jourová, Commissioner for Justice, 
Consumers and Gender Equality stated ‘the Paris attacks in November confirmed the 
urgent need for more robust and seamless judicial cooperation throughout the EU’.11 
In the United Kingdom the murder of teenager Alice Gross by Latvian national Arnis 
Zalkalns in August 2014 further highlights the importance of accurate and timely 
exchange of information between Member States. Zalkalns, who subsequently took his 
own life before he could be arrested and prosecuted, had a previous conviction for 
murder in Latvia, which the Metropolitan Police only became aware of after his 
disappearance and emergence as a suspect in the murder of Alice Gross. Dr Fiona 
Wilcox, the coroner who conducted the inquest into Alice Gross’s death indicated that 
                                                          
10 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3875987.stm <last accessed 18 November 2016> 
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she would recommend to the Home Office that police forces should make “mandatory” 
criminal records checks on foreign nationals following their arrest.12  
The operation of ECRIS 
The cases of Fourniret and Zalkalns highlight the value of a system allowing the reliable 
exchange of criminal records information between Member States, particularly in the 
context of free movement across borders. The need to share such information is the 
basis of Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA which established the ECRIS. 
This system was designed to achieve an efficient, uniform exchange of information on 
criminal convictions between EU member states and to ensure that an individual’s 
criminal conviction was effectively communicated and stored regardless of where in the 
EU that person was convicted of the offence.   
Council Framework Decision 2009/316/JHA implemented Council Framework 
Decision 2009/315/JHA in order to build and develop a computerised system of 
exchange of information on convictions between Member States13. The Framework 
Decision required the establishment of “a standardised format allowing information to 
                                                          
12 Alice Gross coroner calls for immigration checks on foreign nationals, 4th July 2016, The Independent. Available 
at; http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/alice-gross-murder-inquest-coroner-home-office-death-14-year-
old-girl-a7119391.html. <last accessed 18 November 2016> 
13 The development of ECRIS was partially based on the results of studies previously conducted by IRCP: G 
Vermeulen, T Vander-Beken, E De Busser & A Dormaels. (2002). Blueprint for an EU Criminal Records Database. 
Legal, politico-institutional and practical feasibility. Antwerp - Apeldoorn, Maklu, E De Busser. (2008). A European 
Criminal Records Database: An integrated model. In C Stefanou & H Xanthaki. Towards a European Criminal Record. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 336-354. 
be exchanged in a uniform, electronic and easily computer-translatable way”14. The 
result of this requirement was the development of ECRIS; a standardised mechanism for 
the sharing of criminal conviction data between Member States.  
The duty to store information regarding an individual’s criminal record rests with the 
Member State which is the individual’s country of origin15. Where an individual is 
convicted of an offence within a Member State which is not that individual’s country of 
origin there is an obligation on the Member State within whose jurisdiction the 
individual has been convicted to transmit that information to the relevant Member State. 
Requests may then be made to the individual’s country of origin for information relating 
to that that person’s criminal record16 and the individual’s country of origin will then 
transmit any relevant information to the requesting state.17 This ensures that each 
Member State is able to reply fully to requests for information from other Member 
States and can provide up to date information on the criminal records of its own 
nationals’ regardless of where in the EU those convictions were handed down.  The 
                                                          
14  Council Framework Decision 2009/316/JHA, para 6. For further discussion regarding standardisation of forensic 
science see; TJ Wilson. The Global Perspective, in M Walport. (Ed) Forensic Science and Beyond: Authenticity, 
Provenance and Assurance, Chapter 8, Annual Report of the Government Chief Scientific Advisor, (2015) 
Government Office for Science; TJ Wilson. Criminal Justice and Global Public Goods: The Prüm Forensic Biometric Co-
operation Model, J. Crim. L. 2016, 80(5), 303-326 
15 Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA, Article 5(1) 
16 ibid, Article 6 
17 ibid, Article 7 
system is decentralised which means that data is only stored on national databases and 
then exchanged upon the request of another Member State.18 
A standardised format is used to transmit the information electronically19.  Convictions 
are coded using two reference tables listing categories of offences and penalties. These 
tables facilitate automatic translation and are designed to enhance mutual understanding 
of the information transmitted. Theoretically, the codes of the offence and sanction 
should be translated into the language of the recipients enabling them to understand the 
nature of the conviction and relevant penalty.   
The United Kingdom had previously chosen to exercise a block “opt-out” of various co-
operation measures relating to criminal justice and policing. Speaking in the House of 
Commons on the 9th July 2013, then Home Secretary Theresa May stated that: 
“For reasons of principle, policy and pragmatism, I believe that it is in the 
national interest to exercise the United Kingdom’s opt-out, and rejoin a much 
                                                          
18 ibid, Article 5 
19 Under Article 11 of Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA Member States must give information on the 
nature of the conviction (date of conviction, name of the court, date on which the decision became final) and  
information on the offence giving rise to the conviction (date of the offence underlying the conviction and name or 
legal classification of the offence as well as reference to the applicable legal provisions) and information on the 
contents of the conviction (notably the sentence as well as any supplementary penalties, security measures and 
subsequent decisions modifying the enforcement of the sentence). There is no requirement to provide information 
as to the factual circumstances surrounding the conviction. 
smaller set of measures that help us to cooperate with our European neighbours 
in the fight against serious and organised crime.”20 
ECRIS, along with the principle of mutual recognition (discussed below), were two of 
thirty-five “smaller measures” which the United Kingdom chose to implement 
following the use of its block opt out.21 By joining ECRIS, the UK was then able to 
replace previous “ad hoc” arrangements between the UK and other EU Member States. 
In respect of this change, the UK government identified that: 
“Criminal Record Exchange through these measures [ECRIS] has allowed much 
more information to be obtained on EU offenders in the UK and on UK 
nationals convicted elsewhere in the EU. This has allowed the police to build a 
fuller picture of offending by UK nationals and allowed the courts to be aware 
of previous offending by EU nationals being prosecuted in the UK. The previous 
convictions can be used for bail, bad character and sentencing as well as by the 
prison and probation service when dealing with the offender once sentenced.”22 
The ECRIS system was implemented in all EU Member States by April 2012 thereby 
allowing pan European access to criminal records information, subject only to the 
limitations created by national storage arrangements for this type of information.  
                                                          
20 See the Home Secretary’s Oral Statement, HC Deb, 9 July 2013, col. 180. 
21 House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, The UK’s block opt-out of pre-Lisbon criminal law and policing 
measures, Twenty-first Report of Session 2013-14, (2013) HC683 
22 ibid. at p. 68, [243] 
In England and Wales, the UK government is responsible for storing and, where 
appropriate, transmitting to other Member States information regarding the criminal 
records of its citizens. An organisation created by The Association of Chief Police 
Officers23 (ACPO) the ACPO Criminal Records Office (ACRO) is the body responsible 
for the management of all criminal records information in the United Kingdom. Foreign 
criminal convictions are handled under ACRO’s International Criminal Conviction 
Exchange portfolio comprising of the Non-EU Exchange of Criminal Records (NEU-
ECR) and the UK Central Authority for the Exchange of Criminal Records (UKCA-
ECR). The UKCA-ECR is the designated central authority for exchanging criminal 
records for England and Wales and the rest of the United Kingdom with other EU 
member states utilising ECRIS. 
By March 2016 the United Kingdom was connected to 23 out of 27 Member States 
using ECRIS with manual arrangements in place for the remaining 4 Member States.24 
In the financial year 2015/16 ACRO (through the UKCA-ECR) received 10,120 
notification messages in total about UK nationals convicted overseas of which 9,223 
                                                          
23 Now known as the National Police Chief’s Council (NPCC) 
24 ACRO Criminal Records Office, Annual Report 2015/16, p.18,  
https://www.acro.police.uk/uploadedFiles/Annual%20Report%20A4%202015-16%20spread.pdf <accessed 
11/01/2017> 
 
originated from EU Member States.25 In the same period the United Kingdom sent 
46,680 notification messages to other countries in respect of criminal convictions 
handed down by a UK court. Over ¾ of the notifications sent by the UK related to EU 
nationals.26   
In England and Wales, once a notification relating to the conviction of an English or 
Welsh national in another EU jurisdiction is received via ECRIS, any relevant offence is 
matched to its equivalent offence under English and Welsh law. Once the offence has 
been matched it is then recorded on the Police National Computer (PNC) as a 
conviction for the corresponding offence under English and Welsh law. The only 
indication when looking at the individual’s criminal record that an offence was 
committed in a foreign jurisdiction is the name of the convicting court. ACRO provide 
information to the Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) for the purposes of criminal 
records checks and certificates of criminal records to the courts. In criminal proceedings 
in England and Wales, once it has been determined that a person’s previous conviction 
is admissible in evidence it can be proved under s.73(1) PACE 1984 which provides: 
“Where in any proceedings the fact that a person has in the United Kingdom or 
any other member state been convicted… of an offence… is admissible in 
evidence, it may be proved by producing a certificate of conviction…” 
                                                          
25 Ibid. p.21 
26 Ibid. p.8 
The admission of the conviction then gives rise to a rebuttable presumption that the 
person committed the offence of which they were convicted (s.74 PACE 1984).  
Exchange of information under ECRIS requires the labelling of offences and in this 
regard it is linked to the concept of “approximation of laws”27 (approximation). 
Approximation entails the adoption of measures establishing minimum rules related to 
the constituent elements of offences and sanctions. The aim of approximation is to 
overcome the significant legal differences found across the EU by establishing common 
ground upon which cooperation is established28.  Approximation of laws has also been 
described by Weyembergh as reducing the point between two objects in order to 
eliminate differences that would otherwise make cooperation difficult or even 
impossible29. She goes on to argue that: 
Approximation is a condition for smooth judicial cooperation mechanisms and 
especially for mutual recognition. This process must be based on mutual 
confidence, which becomes far more important in the context of the classic 
mechanisms of cooperation. As a consequence of this evolution, approximation 
                                                          
27 Article 114(1) Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union  
28 W De Bondt & G Vermeulen. Appreciating Approximation. Using common offence concepts to facilitate police and 
judicial cooperation in the EU, in Cools, M., Readings On Criminal Justice, Criminal Law & Policing. Antwerp-
Apeldoorn-Portland, Maklu 4 (2010): 15-40.  
29 A Weyembergh. (2005). Approximation of criminal laws, the Constitutional Treaty and the Hague Programme. 
Common Market Law Review, 42, 1567. 
also becomes more essential, as it is necessary for the realisation as well as for 
the legitimacy of mutual trust30. 
ECRIS is a tool which allows for the labelling of exchanged information in a way 
which, it has been argued, does not fully realise the potential of the approximation 
acquis31. The roots of ECRIS come from the Hague programme which asserted that the 
efficient and swift exchange of information on the criminal history of individuals 
constituted an important priority32. ECRIS moves the exchange of information on from 
a system which envisages countries sharing information to one where that information 
is to be taken into account in the course of new criminal proceedings, and legal effects 
equivalent to previous national convictions will be attached to it.  In such 
circumstances, it becomes all the more important that the approximation acquis is used 
to its full potential33.  De Bondt and Vermeulen suggest that: 
“Indicating that the foreign offence falls within the minimum constituent 
elements of offences as agreed in an approximation instrument34, would not 
just facilitate the taking into account of the conviction in the course of new 
                                                          
30 Ibid. p. 1574 
31 F Geyer. Taking stock: databases and systems of information exchange in the area of freedom, security and 
justice. CEPS, 2008. 
32 C Stefanou & H Xanthaki. (2008). Towards a European Criminal Record. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
33 n. 28 
34 An example of a relevant approximation instrument would be terrorism as defined in the 2002 FD on combating 
terrorism (OJL 164 of 22.6.2002), amended by the 2008 FD (OJ L 330 of 9.12.2008). 
criminal proceedings; the lack thereof will potentially render interpretation 
impossible35.” 
Using this architecture, conviction information shared through ECRIS could be tagged 
to indicate whether it relates to a conviction based on an agreed minimum definition as 
set out in an EU instrument or not. Labelling exchanged information as to whether or 
not it corresponds to an approximated offence concept has the potential to considerably 
facilitate the comprehensibility of such information.  EULOCS – the EU level offence 
classification system – represents the practical implementation of this approach and was 
developed following the success of ECRIS36. Its design allows it to be used as a 
separate reference index.  The backbone of EULOCS is based on a complex architecture 
which requires offence labels to be combined with reference to EU instruments which 
hold approximated offence definitions and the definitions themselves. The idea is to 
keep one separate reference index updated which can then be referred to in various legal 
instruments37.  
Information exchange prior to ECRIS:  The Mutual Understanding of Criminal 
Records (MUCRI) Project     
                                                          
35 n. 28, at p. 30 
36 Study on the development of an EU level offence classification system and an assessment of its 
feasibility to supporting the implementation of the Action Plan to develop an EU strategy to measure crime and 
criminal justice: The Crime Statistics Project available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/doc_centre/crime/docs/eulocs_en.pdf <last accessed 18 November 2016> 
37 V Gert & W De Bondt. EULOCS: The EU Level Offence Classification System: a Bench-mark for Enhanced 
International Coherence of the EU's Criminal Policy. Vol. 35. Maklu, 2009. 
Prior to the establishment of ECRIS the exchange of criminal records between Member 
States still took place but such exchange was usually on a bilateral basis.38 The MUCRI 
project was undertaken before the implementation of ECRIS and was designed to 
facilitate better understanding of criminal records information shared between Member 
States. The project received EU funding and was undertaken by the Association of 
Chief Police Officers Criminal Records Office (ACRO), who sought to conduct an 
offence equivalency exercise, which involved attempting to verify the accuracy of 
matches previously made by ACRO between a number of German and English / Welsh 
offences.  
The authors were invited to consider the accuracy of matches made between over 200 
German offences and the corresponding English and Welsh offences to which they had 
been recorded as equivalent to.  Some matches had been made following notification 
from the German authorities that a conviction had been imposed and the authors were 
asked to comment upon whether the existing match was appropriate. In other cases, a 
match had been suggested and, again, we were asked to comment on whether that match 
was appropriate and to suggest alternatives where possible. Whilst there is insufficient 
data to offer a value on the accuracy of the matches made, a number of potential issues 
                                                          
38 Regulated by Articles 13 and 22 of the European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (1959); see 
also, E De Busser. (2008). A European Criminal Records Database: An integrated model, in C.Stefanou & H Xanthaki. 
(Eds.), Towards a European Criminal Record (pp. 336-354). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
with the equivalency process were identified as a result of the exercise, some of which 
will be discussed further below. 
- Lack of reliable translation 
Prior to the implementation of ECRIS Member States would receive notifications of 
foreign convictions in a variety of ways.  At times the direct translation of the foreign 
offence into English would be inaccurate or incomplete. This made it difficult if not 
impossible to match the offence with an English offence with any degree of certainty as 
a result of the deficiencies in the translation. An example of this problem can be found 
in relation to German convictions matched to an offence under section 21(2)(2) of the 
Road Traffic Act 1988.  The translation of the German code which was being used in 
order to achieve these matches was translated as:  
“Intentionally or negligently performs a motor vehicle, although the required 
driver's license taken in accordance with s.94 of the Criminal Procedure Code in 
custody, secured or seized, or.” (sic) 
It is clear that matching of an offence based on an incomplete or inaccurate translation 
would be capable of undermining the efficacy and fairness of the criminal record 
exchange process, potentially raising Article 8 ECHR issues.  While it is possible for an 
individual to challenge any entry on their criminal record as inaccurate39 such 
inaccuracies would only become apparent to that individual in circumstances where the 
information falls to be disclosed  
- Difficulty defining key terms 
Significant problems could arise in the matching of offences when certain key legal 
terms such as ‘intention’ and ‘recklessness’ were not properly understood. An example 
of this would be a person convicted of the German equivalent offence of causing 
grievous bodily harm where the German court had found the person to have intended to 
cause that level of harm. This would potentially amount to an English and Welsh 
offence under section 18 of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 (maximum 
sentence life imprisonment). However if the German courts established that intent by 
using their principle of “conditional intention” this would be more akin to recklessness 
and would not be sufficient mens rea for the section 18 offence and would be more 
suitably matched with the less serious offence created by section 20 Offences Against 
the Person Act 1861 (maximum sentence of five years imprisonment).  Under the pre 
ECRIS system it was not possible to tell which offence was the closest match. 
Secondly problems in accurately translating terminology and understanding of the legal 
implications of a term mean that it can be impossible to say with certainty that offences 
                                                          
39 See DBS website for details of how to appeal an error: https://www.gov.uk/disclosure-barring-service-
check/appeals-and-disputes  <last accessed on 18 November 2016>  
truly match.  For example, a number of German sexual offences criminalise “sexual 
activity”. The term “sexual” is defined in English law in s.78 Sexual Offences Act 2003 
very specifically but the German criminal code has no such explanation and without 
access to a German lawyer or details of the exact nature of the offence it would be very 
difficult to ensure the foreign offence was recorded in an accurate way40.  
- Accurately recording convictions; matching offences and offence seriousness 
The difficulties raised above concern differing definitions of offences and the difficulty 
in interpreting key terms. Zweigert & Kotz suggest that: 
For states which are members of the European Union, the harmonisation of law 
by surpa-national means (Community guidelines and directives) is of ever 
increasing significance… Where there are areas of difference, one must 
reconcile them either by adopting the best existing variant or by finding, through 
comparative methods, a new solution which is better and more easily applied 
than any of the existing ones.41 
There was also a fundamental difficulty in matching offences caused by the different 
approaches that national law may take in relation to the creation and definition of 
                                                          
40  For an outline of the fundamental aspects of the German approach to criminal procedure see M 
Bohlander. Principles in German Criminal Procedure (2012) 1st Editon (Hart Publishing, Oxford) 
41 K Zweigert & H Kotz. An Introduction to Comparative Law, (Third Edition), (2011) Oxford University Press, p. 24 & 
42 
criminal offences. Typically the German Code favours brevity and uses generic terms, 
English law, in contrast is much more detailed and specific, certainly as far as statutory 
offences are concerned. This creates serious problems for offence matching.  
A key problem identified was that German offences were typically drafted more widely 
than English offences. Thus, it was possible in almost all cases to conceive of conduct 
that would constitute an offence under the relevant section of the German Code but 
would not constitute an offence under the closest corresponding English statutory or 
common law provision. Again, without knowing precisely the facts of the particular 
offence, it would therefore be impossible to say with certainty that the “matching” 
English offence was made out in all cases.  For example, 3 sections of the German code 
cover insolvency offences (although there are a number of subsections to each of these). 
In contrast there are 69 criminal offences contained in the Insolvency Act 1986 alone.  
This makes the task of offence matching very complicated with a number of possible 
offences covering a single subsection of the German code. 
Particular problems arose when attempting to match sexual offences. In English and 
Welsh law, the Sexual Offences Act 2003 separates sexual activity according to the 
nature of that activity42. For example, there are four key sexual offences against adults 
                                                          
42 See for discussion; K Laird and D Ormerod. Chapter 18: Sexual Offences, Smith & Hogan's Criminal Law, 14th 
Edition, (2015) Oxford University Press, Oxford; A Simester, J Spencer, G Sullivan & G Virgo. Chapter 12: The 
Principal Sexual Offences,  Simester and Sullivan’s Criminal Law: Theory and Doctrine, 5th Edition, (2013) Hart 
Publishing; Ashworth.  
under the 2003 Act, namely rape43, assault by penetration44, sexual assault45 and causing 
a person to engage in sexual activity46. Under s.177 of the German Code, rape would 
include assault by penetration. Section 177 of the German Code also fails to separate 
sexual assault and causing a person to engage in sexual activity. Thus, without knowing 
precisely what activity took place in any particular case, it was not possible to say 
which of the four English and Welsh offences would be the most appropriate match.  
At times there is disparity in the way in which criminal justice systems view certain 
criminal acts.  Germany, for example, has a more liberal approach to mercy killing than 
England and Wales47. Section 126 of the German Criminal Code criminalises killing at 
the request of the victim with a penalty of 6 months to 5 years imprisonment.  
Technically the closest match in England and Wales would be murder.  Although we do 
have an offence under section 2 Suicide Act 1961 – criminal liability for complicity in 
another’s suicide – if the act of the defendant actually ended the life of the victim, 
murder, and not the offence under s.2 of the 1961 Act, would be the appropriate charge.  
Simester et al., identify that the “pronouncement of guilt through conviction… connotes 
fault on the part of the criminal” with a corresponding “public implication that she is 
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45 Ibid. Section 3 
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blameworthy.”48 In relation to the recording of foreign convictions it therefore becomes 
important to consider two relevant legal principles. The first is whether the conduct 
would be sufficient to amount to a criminal offence in that person’s home jurisdiction. If 
the conduct would not be sufficient to amount to a crime then to record it as such would 
offend against the principle nullem crimen sine lege.49 As Roberts and Zuckerman 
observe: 
The symbolic sting of censure may be more painful to an offender than any hard 
treatment meted out to him as tangible punishment. In some cases moral 
condemnation may inflict lasting injury on a convict’s self-respect and standing 
in the community, the effects of which endure long after a fine has been paid or 
a prison sentence served.50 
The second potentially relevant consideration relates to how a foreign conviction is 
eventually recorded and whether the offence chosen falls foul of the principle of “fair 
labelling”.51 According to Horder “…what matters is not just that one has been 
convicted, but of what one has been convicted. If the offence in question gives too 
anaemic a conception of what that might be, it is fair neither to the defendant, nor to the 
                                                          
48 A Simester. et al. n. 42 at p. 7-8 
49 “No crime without law.” See A Simester et al. ibid. at p. 22 
50 P Roberts & A Zuckerman. Criminal Evidence (Second Edition), (2010) Oxford University Press, p. 13 
51 See: A Ashworth. The Elasticity of Mens Rea in CFH Tapper (ed), Crime, Proof and Punishment: Essays in Memory 
of Sir Rupert Cross, (1981) London: Butterworth, 45 (termed “representative labelling”); G Williams. Convictions and 
Fair Labelling, (1983) CLJ 42(1), 85-95 
victim.”52 This supports the position of Chalmers and Leverick53 who suggest that fair 
labelling is necessary both “to describe D’s offending behaviour for the general public 
and to differentiate that behaviour for the purposes of those working within the criminal 
justice system.”54 Whilst similar terms may be used to describe criminal offending in a 
number of jurisdictions, care must be taken to ensure that the defendant’s conduct 
warrants the recording of a particular offence in their home jurisdiction.  
The potential implications of sharing criminal records information under Article 8 
ECHR 
It is now widely accepted by both the national courts in England and Wales and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) that the storing of personal information by 
state agencies is capable of engaging convention rights and in particular the right to 
respect for private and family life under Article 8 ECHR55. In Leander v Sweden, the 
court held that “both the storing and the release of such information… amounted to an 
interference with… [an individual’s]… right to respect for private life as guaranteed by 
Article 8(1).”56   
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54 A Ashworth. Principles of Criminal Law, (2009), 6th Edition, Oxford, p. 79 
55 See for example; Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433; S and Marper v the United Kingdom [2009] 48 E.H.R.R. 50; 
R (on the application of T and another) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and another [2014] UKSC 35.  
56 Leander v Sweden (1987) 9 EHRR 433 at [48] 
Despite the ECtHR’s decision in Leander v Sweden it took another twenty years and 
further intervention from the ECtHR before the national courts in England and Wales 
properly considered the implications of Article 8 in relation to the storage and use of 
data for criminal justice purposes. During this time there was a significant increase in 
the capacity of the police and other state agencies to record and store criminal justice 
information.  This was prompted by the growth of the UK’s National DNA Database 
(NDNAD) which was set up in 1995 and which, between 2000 and 2005, was subject to 
an “expansion programme”57 making it at the time the world’s largest database of its 
kind.58 
The application of Article 8 ECHR was established in the context of information stored 
for criminal justice purposes (which will be termed “criminal justice information”) in 
the case of S and Marper v the United Kingdom (S and Marper).59 S, who was 11 at the 
time of his arrest, was acquitted following trial for an attempted robbery. Marper, who 
had been charged with harassment of his partner, had proceedings against him 
discontinued. Both sought to challenge the subsequent decision of the Chief Constable 
of South Yorkshire Police to indefinitely retain their fingerprints and DNA. Having 
                                                          
57 Forensic Science and Pathology Unit, DNA Expansion Programme 2000-2005: Reporting Achievement, (2006), 
Home Office 
58 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, The National DNA Database, (2006) Postnote No.258, POST; C 
Nydick. The British Invasion (of Privacy): DNA Databases in the United Kingdom and United States in the Wake of the 
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59 [2009] 48 E.H.R.R. 50 
been unsuccessful in the domestic courts in England and Wales60 S and Marper applied 
to the ECtHR on the basis that the storage of biometric data (fingerprints and DNA 
profiles) engaged Article 8 ECHR. Further, S and Marper asserted that the policy in 
operation in England and Wales to indefinitely retain the biometric data of unconvicted 
persons violated Article 8 ECHR and could not be justified by the application of a 
‘margin of appreciation’.  
The ECtHR identified that “[t]he mere storing of data relating to the private life of an 
individual amounts to an interference within the meaning of art.8”.61 In respect of the 
statutory criteria in England and Wales for the retention and use of DNA profiles and 
fingerprints from unconvicted individuals62 the ECtHR went on to hold that the 
retention system in operation at that time was “blanket and indiscriminate” and 
“overstepped any acceptable margin of appreciation”63. 
Subsequent to the decision in S and Marper, both the ECtHR and the national courts in 
England and Wales, confirmed the application of Article 8 to a range of different types 
of criminal justice information including DNA profiles64, fingerprints65 and 
                                                          
60 See: R (on the application of S) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police; R (on the application of 
Marper) v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [2004] UKHL 39 
61 S & Marper, n. 59, at [68] 
62 B Hepple. Forensic databases: implications of the cases of S and Marper. (2009) Medicine, Science and the Law 
49.2. 77-87. 
63 S & Marper, n. 59, at [119], [125] 
64 S & Marper, n. 59 
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photographs66.  In the case of M.K. v. France67, a case concerning the retention of 
fingerprints, the ECHR reiterated that the protection of personal data was of 
fundamental importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private 
life. This applied with even greater force when such data underwent automatic 
processing and / or use for policing purposes68.   
Despite the fact that the court in S and Marper was primarily concerned with the 
retention of data from unconvicted persons, in the case of R (L) v Commissioner of 
Police of the Metropolis69 (R(L)), it was confirmed that the storage and disclosure of 
criminal records information was also capable of engaging an individual’s Article 8 
rights. The case identified two separate bases on which the disclosure of information 
about convictions or cautions70 can constitute an interference with Article 8(1). Firstly, 
disclosure of personal information that individuals may wish to keep private can 
constitute an interference; although, in one sense, criminal convictions are public as the 
conviction is made, and sentence imposed, in public as the conviction recedes into the 
past it becomes part of the individual's private life. A caution is not administered in 
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(Admin) 
67 M.K. v France [2013] Application no. 19522/09 
68 ibid. at [29], [35]  
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70 A police caution (since 2005 more properly known as a simple caution) is a formal warning given by the police to 
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public and so is part of the individual's private life from the outset.71 Secondly, 
disclosure of historic information about convictions or cautions can lead to a person's 
exclusion from employment72, and can therefore adversely affect his or her ability to 
develop relations with others73; the problems that this creates as regards the possibility 
of earning a living can have serious repercussions on enjoyment of private life. 
It is clear that the disclosure of information relating to an individual’s criminal record 
can have a powerful impact.  In R(L) Lord Neuberger identified that an adverse criminal 
record certificate would be something close to a "killer blow"74 to the hopes of a person 
who aspires to a post which falls within the scope of any disclosure requirements. It is 
therefore imperative that such information is accurate, retained and disclosed only in 
proper circumstances and, where appropriate, subject to challenge. In the UK wrongly 
recorded information can be challenged through the Disclosure and Barring Service 
with appeals ultimately decided by the Independent Monitor.75 However, individuals 
can only appeal an incorrect entry on their criminal record if they are aware of its 
existence.  As individuals are not routinely made aware of the inclusion of a foreign 
conviction on their record this may only occur at the point that access to the criminal 
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record is required for the purposes of an application for certain types of employment or 
in the context of criminal proceedings. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in R(L) not only established the applicability of Article 8 
ECHR in the context of criminal records disclosure but also highlighted the likelihood 
that indiscriminate retention and, in particular, disclosure was unlikely to be compliant 
with an individual’s convention rights. This confirmed the departure from earlier 
decisions76 in which the applicability of Article 8 ECHR in the context of criminal 
records disclosure was doubted. The approach of the Supreme Court in R(L) was 
subsequently followed by the ECtHR in MM v the United Kingdom (MM), where the 
Court held that "...indiscriminate and open-ended collection of criminal record data is 
unlikely to comply with the requirements of Article 8 in the absence of clear and 
detailed statutory regulations clarifying the safeguards applicable."77  
The principle that information can be stored or shared in ways which is 
proportionate to the objective is set out in The Data Protection Act 1998. The Act 
stipulates that the processing of personal data is subject to eight data protection 
principles listed in Schedule 1. The third principle provides that personal data 
shall be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purpose or purposes 
for which they are processed.  Additionally Article 5 of the Data Protection 
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Convention78 provides that personal data undergoing automatic processing shall 
be:  
a. obtained and processed fairly and lawfully;  
b. stored for specified and legitimate purposes and not used in a way 
incompatible with those purposes; and  
c. adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for 
which they are stored.  
The Committee of Ministers adopted Recommendation No. R (87) 15 regulating 
the use of personal data in the police sector. Principle 2.1 of the Recommendation 
states that: 
The collection of personal data for police purposes should be limited to 
such as is necessary for the prevention of a real danger or the suppression 
of a specific criminal offence. Any exception to this provision should be 
the subject of specific national legislation. 
Of further relevance is Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA on the protection of 
personal data processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in 
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criminal matters which was adopted on 27 November 2008. Its purpose is to 
ensure a high level of protection of the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural 
persons, and in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of 
personal data in the framework of cross-border police and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters while guaranteeing a high level of public safety.  
Notwithstanding the significant body of law in this area the case of MM 
highlighted that no real consideration had been given to proportionality within the 
UK’s system for recording and disclosing criminal justice information. 
The decisions in R(L)79 and MM80 highlighted a shift away from consideration of 
the issue of retention and disclosure of criminal records information as a data 
protection issue and towards an approached based on the rights of the individual 
under Article 8 ECHR. In determining that the disclosure of a caution constituted 
an unjustified interference with the applicant’s Article 8 rights the ECtHR 
highlighted “…the absence of a clear legislative framework… the absence of an 
independent mechanism for independent review of a decision to retain or disclose 
data… [and] the limited filtering arrangements in respect of disclosures [under the 
regime in operation at the time]…”81 as factors which might lead to a breach. The 
response of the UK government was to attempt to introduce some flexibility into 
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the retention and disclosure system by excluding certain convictions based on age 
and conviction type.  
Changes to the retention regime in the UK since 2012  
The rules for the retention and disclosure of criminal records information in Northern 
Ireland, having been successfully challenged in MM82 as being in breach of Article 8 
ECHR, were substantially revised by the passing of the Protection of Freedoms Act 
(POFA) 2012. The POFA established the Disclosure and Barring Service to administer 
criminal records disclosure requests in accordance with new statutory provisions.83  
Despite the “filtering” rules introduced by POFA the caution that was the subject of the 
application in MM would likely have been disclosed. The defendant in MM had 
accepted a caution for child abduction and was applying for a job working with 
children. The role would have been exempt from the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 
1974 and her caution for child abduction, although over 6 years old, would still have 
been disclosed. The breach of Article 8 was upheld by the ECtHR not because they 
agreed that the caution should not have been disclosed in this particular case but 
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83 Under the statutory regime created by the POFA convictions and cautions would not be disclosed if: 
a) eleven years have elapsed since the date of conviction or six years in the case of a caution ; 
b) it is the person’s only offence ; and   
c) the offence did not result in a custodial sentence . 
Under the rules contained in the POFA conviction information would only be removed if the underlying offence was 
not one of the more than 1000 offences (notably including offences involving child victims) that would always fall to 
be disclosed.  
because the system of recording and disclosing all criminal records information in all 
cases was disproportionate84. 
The Supreme Court considered the statutory regime in England and Wales for retention 
and disclosure of criminal records information in R (on the application of T and 
another) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and another85. The case 
concerned the inclusion of spent convictions on Enhanced Criminal Record 
Certificates86 (ECRC) issued in respect individuals seeking employment and the court 
held that the inclusion of a spent conviction or caution could constitute an interference 
with Article 8 ECHR. Affirming in part the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal87, the 
court observed that: 
Put shortly, legislation which requires the indiscriminate disclosure by the state 
of personal data which it has collected and stored does not contain adequate 
safeguards against arbitrary interferences with article 8 rights.88 
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Prior to the decision of the Supreme Court in R (on the application of T and another), 
the government took the pre-emptive step of amending the criminal records disclosure 
regime in England and Wales by passing the Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974 
(Exceptions) Order 1975 (Amendment) (England and Wales) Order 201389 and the 
Police Act 1997 (Criminal Record Certificates: Relevant Matters) (Amendment) 
(England and Wales) Order 2013.90 The amended regime allows for non-disclosure of 
criminal record information on an ECRC where the conviction or caution is protected.91   
Although the amended regime was described obiter by the Supreme Court as being 
more “nuanced”, 92 a number of recent cases suggest that the government failed to 
sufficiently appreciate the extent to which Article 8 requires bright line rules to be 
tempered by recourse to adequate review mechanisms in the context of criminality 
information. In R (on the applications of P, A) v Secretary of State for Justice93 the 
claimants sought declarations that the scheme under the Police Act 1997 as amended94 
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was incompatible with ECHR Article 8.  Under the amended provisions if a person has 
two or more convictions they will always fall to be disclosed.  The first claimant was a 
former teacher who had two minor shoplifting convictions committed 16 years ago 
when she was suffering from mental health problems and the second claimant was a 51 
year old finance director who had been convicted at the ages of 17 and 18 of theft and 
driving without insurance.  Both of these claimants were caught under the new regime.  
The Court of Appeal made significant reference to the Supreme Court case of R(T)95 
and the ECHR case of MM96 along with the Northern Irish case of Gallagher’s 
Application97. The case quoted the judgement of Girvan LJ who although accepting that 
the state is entitled to implement a ‘bright line rule those rules cannot be at the expense 
of the core of the fundamental rights which the convention seeks to protect’.   Any line 
drawn by legislation would have to be as close to the point at which criminal record 
information ceases to be relevant as possible.  This must be the case as the disclosure of 
irrelevant criminal information goes further than is necessary to achieve the objective of 
protecting vulnerable people and must therefore breach Article 8. LJ McCombe stated 
that the case before him demonstrated: 
that the rules can give rise to some very startling consequences. Such results are, 
in my judgement, properly to be described as arbitrary…  [if] rules are capable 
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of producing such questionable results, on their margins there ought... to be 
some machinery for testing the proportionality of the interference if the scheme 
if to be “in accordance with the law” under the wider understanding of the 
concept that emerges from the T case, following the MM case.’ 98 
The court reached the conclusion that the Act in its present form fails to meet ECHR 
requirements. There could be no rational for thinking that the minor convictions of the 
two claimants bore, for the rest of the claimants’ lifetime, a rational relationship with 
the objects sought to be achieved by the disclosure provisions of the Act simply because 
there was more than one conviction. This line of reasoning has subsequently been 
followed in R (on the application of G) v Chief Constable of Surrey  where the court 
held that the absence of any procedure enabling a decision-maker to examine all of the 
relevant considerations resulted in the statutory regime being incompatible with the 
claimant’s Article 8 right.99 
It is clear from the emerging body of case law that there are still significant problems 
with the system of retention and disclosure in England and Wales despite the creation of 
a more nuanced “bright line” system which differentiates between different types of 
convictions and their age.  The domestic situation in the UK also raises issues relevant 
to the sharing of criminal records information under ECRIS on the basis that “even a 
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comparatively minor interference with a person's right to respect for private life calls for 
justification”.100 It is argued that the above case law firmly establishes the relevance of 
Article 8 to the retention and disclosure of criminal records information both within and 
between Member States. It is therefore imperative that the information that is stored and 
shared is done so “in accordance with the law” in a way that is proportionate, 
transparent and subject to appropriate challenge regardless of whether this is 
information which is domestic in nature or shared through the ECRIS system.  
 The Council Framework Decisions which established ECRIS are concerned primarily 
with the mechanisms enabling the sharing of information between Member States and 
with the construction of systems capable of facilitating that process. ECRIS gives no 
consideration to whether Member States store and share the information 
proportionately, in accordance with the law and within any relevant margin of 
appreciation.  This approach is consistent with the principle of mutual recognition101 
which has become the cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the 
EU since the 1999 European Council meeting in Tampere.102 This does not mean that 
                                                          
100 R (on the application of Catt) v Association of Chief Police Officers of England, Wales and Northern Ireland and 
another (Equality and Human Rights Commission and others intervening) & R (on the application of T) v 
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individual Member States need not give consideration to what information they are 
storing and disclosing via ECRIS.  This is particularly important in relation to the 
automated sharing of information across jurisdictions with enhanced needs for robust 
safeguards against error103.  
In this context any weaknesses within the ECRIS system or failures to properly 
safeguard information at a national level may potentially lead to breaches of an 
individual’s Article 8 rights. Consideration will be given below to some of the 
difficulties that might be faced by the current operation of ECRIS and to the questions 
of whether more overt safeguards should be implemented both with ECRIS and at a 
national level. It should be noted that, as there is limited empirical data available, any 
weaknesses identified are largely theoretical. It is contended that further work needs to 
be done to collect data on the veracity of criminal records information shared through 
the ECRIS system and to identify where possible the extent of the use of foreign 
convictions,  the context in which these convictions are used and the effectiveness of 
any safeguards in place. 
As discussed above, the ECRIS system places the responsibility for the retention and 
storage of criminal records information on the Member State which is the country of 
                                                                                                                                                                          
mutual recognition in criminal matters in the EU. Common Market Law Review 43.5 (2006): 1277-1311. V Mitsilegas. 
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103 M.K. v France, n. 67 at [35] 
origin of the convicted person. ECRIS then provides a standardised mechanism for the 
sharing of that information. The ECRIS system is therefore entirely reliant on the 
safeguarding measure put in place by Member States at a national level and the input of 
the Member States into the relevant non-binding coding manuals for the recording of 
convictions under the national criminal law of the Member State. Much of the onus will 
therefore be on individual Member States to ensure general compliance with the Article 
8 requirements associated with the collection and sharing of criminal conviction 
information.  This is within the context of both their national legislative frameworks and 
operational safeguards in the agencies engaged in the task of sharing such information.  
ECRIS provides the information which is to be stored on the convicted person’s country 
of origin’s national database and this should be done using a process which is open to 
scrutiny so that inaccurate or incorrectly disclosed conviction information is open to 
effective challenge. 
Does ECRIS allow for the fair and reliable exchange of criminal records 
information? 
The implementation of ECRIS can clearly be seen as a positive step from the previously 
ad hoc approach to the sharing of criminal conviction information between Member 
States. This in turn is likely to have addressed many, but not all, of the problems 
identified as a result of the MUCRI project. The work that was done to provide ECRIS 
codes to approximate offences has done much to ensure information which is 
transmitted is more readily understood104.  There should no longer be an issue with 
poorly translated sections of foreign criminal codes.  The coding system would allow us 
to know whether a conviction was coded as either ‘causing grievous bodily injury, 
disfigurement or permanent disability’105 or ‘unintentionally causing grievous bodily 
injury, disfigurement or permanent disability’.106  We no longer need to worry whether 
the definition of sexual in England and Wales and Germany are compatible as the 
relevant codes would distinguish between rape and sexual assault or which section of 
the Insolvency Act most accurately reflects a particular section of the German Criminal 
Code.  Finally, whilst in England and Wales no distinction is drawn between murder 
and intentional assisted killing107 the codes used would make it clear that the offence 
was that of “illegal euthanasia”. Article 5 of the Framework Decision would still require 
that the information be stored for the purposes of retransmission.  As the PNC in 
England and Wales only allows English and Welsh offences to be added to the list of 
previous convictions it is uncertain how such an offence would be recorded or 
retransmitted. 
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There still exist a number of pre ECRIS problems which would not have been resolved 
using ECRIS codes. For example, the German Code criminalises various activities that 
would not be crimes at all under English law. Examples include section 186 of the 
German Code which covers criminal defamation which does not exist in England and 
Wales.  It is anticipated that such an offence would be coded as ‘insults, slander, 
defamation, contempt’ which would potentially have numerous English and Welsh 
equivalents such as section 4A of the Public Order Act 1986 which criminalises 
intentional harassment, alarm or distress. Section 306d of the German Code, 
criminalises negligent arson.  Negligence is not a basis upon which an arson charge 
could be established in England and Wales but the only code that would be available for 
this offence would be arson and it is likely that this is the offence which would be 
recorded on the PNC.  
A final, particularly illustrative, example can be found when examining how certain 
types of sexual offences would be coded and transmitted.  Sexual offences in England 
and Wales require the relevant sexual activity to be carried out without the consent of 
the complainant (unless the complainant is a child or a person suffering from a mental 
disorder impeding choice)108. The German Code criminalises sexual activity with 
various categories of person whether or not consent is absent; see for example, s.174a, b 
and c which criminalise sexual activity with a prisoner, a person detained by order of a 
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public authority, a person who the Defendant is counselling or a Defendant in criminal 
proceedings amongst others.  All of these offences would be coded as rape.  In England 
and Wales they would not be considered to be a sexual offence109 unless the 
complainant had a mental disorder impeding choice. 
In relation to a number of offences, knowledge of the factual basis for a conviction will 
be necessary in order to be confident of properly recording an offence with its 
equivalent in another jurisdiction. This information is not something which is 
automatically available within ECRIS and would significantly increase the cost and 
delay involved in notifying the country of origin of the conviction. Without these facts, 
in a significant number of cases it would be impossible to say with certainty that an 
equivalent offence has been recorded, or indeed whether it is appropriate to record an 
offence at all.  
It is clear from the issues described above that there are potential difficulties in using 
criminal record information in the way United Kingdom Central Authority for the 
Exchange of Criminal Records110 does.  All of these difficulties create the significant 
opportunity for offences to be incorrectly classified and then recorded on an individual’s 
criminal record.  We are unaware of whether other Member States record convictions in 
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110 UKCA-ECR is the designated UK central authority and is responsible for receiving and sending notifications of 
criminal convictions through ECRIS. 
the same way as UKCA.  The Framework Decision does not specify how Member 
States should record convictions notified to them via ECRIS. It is our understanding 
that because of shortcomings in the Police National Computer software only coded 
offences can be entered onto the record and only English and Welsh offences are 
coded111.  
The potential breaches of fundamental rights which could arise from recording offences 
in the manner conducted by UKCA are significant and extend not only to the Article 8 
implications, but to potential infringement of Article 6112.  Offences which are recorded 
against an individual can be used in many ways. Council Framework Decision 
2008/675/JHA of 24 July 2008 on taking account of convictions in the Member States 
of the European Union in the course of new criminal proceedings states that in the 
context of new criminal proceedings, Member States must ensure that convictions 
handed down in another Member State are duly taken into consideration under the same 
conditions as a conviction imposed by the national court of an individual’s country of 
origin. As discussed above, in England and Wales, an individual’s previous criminal 
convictions (including foreign convictions) are potentially used for a range of purposes 
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including vetting for certain types of employment113 and in the context of criminal 
proceedings; for example as evidence of the individual’s (bad) character114 or as an 
aggravating feature in the context of sentencing.115  
Although the MUCRI project, described above, was prior to the implementation of 
ECRIS not all of the difficulties have been remedied as the ECRIS system makes no 
allowance for the automatic exchange of basic factual information relating to the 
offence.  This lack of information provides a significant barrier to the scrutiny and 
challenge of the conviction information by the individual for whom the effects may be 
profound. Paragraph 14 of the Preamble of Council Decision 2009/316/JHA states that: 
The accuracy of the codes mentioned cannot be fully guaranteed by the 
Member State supplying the information and it should not preclude the 
competent authorities in the receiving Member State from interpreting the 
information.  
It would appear that very little independent scrutiny has been undertaken to assess the 
accuracy and veracity of the coded information shared through ECRIS since its 
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implementation.  If the information is originally incorrect there is no ability for the 
translated information to be correct. 
As previously discussed, it would seem that in order to be certain that you have 
correctly matched offences you would need the factual basis behind the conviction in 
many cases116.  When we consider the number of errors which may be made through 
incorrect coding, or incorrect understanding of a coding the room for error is significant. 
It is clear from Recital 13 of the Preamble that providing information relating to the 
factual or legal elements of a particular offence is not envisaged as being obligatory: 
In order to ensure the mutual understanding and transparency of the 
common categorisation, each Member State should submit the list of 
national offences and penalties and measures falling in each category 
referred to in the respective table. Member States may provide a description 
of offences and penalties and measures and, given the usefulness of such 
description, they should be encouraged to do so. Such information should be 
made accessible to Member States.  
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The European Parliament did originally suggest that information exchanges should 
“include a short description of the constitutive elements of the offence”117.   This was 
rejected as, “the proposed obligation would be excessively burdensome for Member 
States and could lead to a considerable delay in the commencement of operation of the 
ECRIS118.”   Instead, Article 5 of the 2009/316/JHA, states that “the list of national 
offences… may also include a short description of the constituent elements of the 
offence.” This again demonstrates that such information is not obligatory nor will it be 
routinely exchanged.  It is asserted that sharing information about the constituent 
elements of the key offences, perhaps held in a central document (as is the case with 
EULOCS), along with a brief summary of the factual basis of each conviction, although 
more cumbersome would drastically reduce the misunderstanding of the information 
being shared and would significantly reduce the possibility of incorrect or inaccurate 
information being entered onto national databases. 
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117 European Parliament, Legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council decision on the establishment of the 
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It is clear that the implementation of the ECRIS system represents a success, allowing 
for uniform transfer of criminal conviction information between Member States and 
introducing a coding system far more nuanced and effective than any of its predecessor 
models. Despite these improvements, little empirical work appears to have been 
undertaken on the scale of the use of the ECRIS system and the accuracy of the 
information which is shared. Whilst it is likely that most of the information exchanged 
through ECRIS is accurate, the relevant Article 8 jurisprudence on this area makes clear 
that a failure to ensure that information is stored, and shared, in a way which is accurate, 
shared only when necessary and subject to sufficient safeguards (including the ability of 
an individual to challenge the basis of a conviction) could give rise to breaches of 
Article 8.119  The effect of the Article 8 jurisprudence must therefore also be considered 
by Member States in respect of the way in which they record and store criminal offence 
information notified to them from other jurisdictions. The fact that a conviction is 
codified and transmitted through an automated system, if anything, makes the need for 
transparent oversight an even greater necessity.  
The relevant central authorities in each Member State have access to a regularly updated 
non-binding manual120. It is suggested that the manual, or a similar document, which 
sets out the way in which convictions are received, translated and recorded, should be 
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made available for all criminal justice practitioners. The manual should clearly set out 
the ways in which potential problems relating to the exchange of foreign criminal 
convictions can be identified and resolved. It is further suggested that individuals should 
be routinely notified when a foreign conviction is added to their record along with 
details of any appropriate mechanism for verifying both the grounds for recording the 
conviction information and the accuracy of the information being recorded.  There is 
currently a significant lack of information available to both criminal justice practitioners 
and members of the public in how to challenge the veracity of information recorded as a 
result of the ECRIS process.  It is suggested that the lack of case law in this area is not 
necessarily an indication of how well ECRIS is working but rather an indication of the 
general ignorance of most criminal justice practitioners to the operation and significance 
of conviction information shared through ECRIS. 
Consideration of the efficacy of ECRIS is particularly timely given the proposals of the 
European Commission to expand the system to include the exchange of criminal records 
on non-EU citizens.121  An adventitious pathway, as suggested herein, is to amend 
ECRIS to include the automated sharing of the factual and legal elements of the 
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conviction along with a robust and transparent system of challenge within each Member 
State.  
Finally, the extent to which the United Kingdom and the European Union continue to 
co-operate on criminal justice matters is likely to be the subject of a great deal of post 
Brexit debate and negotiation. It is also clear that within the rest of the European Union 
there is little appetite for greater harmonisation of criminal laws.122 It is not suggested 
that this would be a necessary or appropriate remedy and in any case Article 4(2) of the 
TEU makes it clear that maintaining law and order and national security are the 
responsibility of individual Member States.  It is however evident that in a European 
Union based on the free movement of citizens the ability to share information in a quick 
and efficient way is important to the security of the EU in relation to crime but also 
potentially other areas such as illegal immigration123. It is further evident that, due to the 
large number of UK citizens living and working in the EU and vice versa, coupled with 
the likelihood that trade and other negotiations between the UK and the EU will be 
predicated on some form of free movement of workers continued co-operation in the 
area of criminal justice will remain vital. Cases such as that of Fourniret,124 the murder 
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Review, Volume 4, Number 3, December 2014, pp. 236-247(12) 
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of Alice Gross125, and the recent terror attacks in Paris and Brussels highlight the 
imperative of effective criminal justice cooperation.126 It is suggested that, in 
furtherance of such effective cooperation, ECRIS is both the most apposite and 
mutually beneficial system for the sharing of criminal records information and is a 
system to which the United Kingdom should retain its involvement.  
This positive endorsement of ECRIS must however be tempered with a note of caution. 
What is now clear from the jurisprudence in this area is that Member States must 
question not only whether the correct information is stored and shared but whether that 
information is accurate, appropriately used and, where appropriate, subject to scrutiny 
and challenge. A failure by Member States to implement a proportionate retention 
system may give rise to a violation of Article 8 ECHR and, where the information is 
used in criminal proceedings may also have Article 6 ECHR implications. Given the 
way in which the ECRIS system operates this is not a criticism of the system per se. 
More so, it is a reminder to Member States of the importance of ensuring that their 
national systems of retention are fair and proportionate.  
Despite potential deficiencies in national retention regimes it is clear that ECRIS 
represents the safest, most efficient and reliable method by which the United Kingdom 
can exchange criminal records information with other European Union Member States. 
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Going forward, ECRIS may also provide an effective mechanism for accessing criminal 
records information from so-called “third country nationals”127, a development that is 
likely to further increase its value to those states with access to the system. As the form 
and extent of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union remains to be 
determined, so the future of criminal justice co-operation between the United Kingdom 
and the European Union exists in a state of some uncertainty. Against this background, 
it is hard to overstate the importance to the United Kingdom of retaining access to, and 
participation in, ECRIS as a vital criminal justice tool.    
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